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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a small macroeconomic model of the Russian
economy. The model is tailored to analyze the impact of the oil price, the exchange
rate, and political stability on economic performance. The model does very well in
explaining Russia’s economic history in the period 1995-2002. We then use the model
to simulate two sets of scenarios, one with various oil price scenarios and one with
various adverse shocks. The simulations suggest that the Russian economy is still
very vulnerable to oil price swings, and that these swings have asymmetric eﬀects.
Indeed the cost of a downward swing of oil prices seems to be larger than the benefit
of an upward swing. We also find that the aggregate eﬀects of an oil price collapse
are comparable to these of renewed political instability. Although their propagation
mechanism is quite diﬀerent, both adverse shocks do have a similar eﬀect on real GDP.
A real exchange rate appreciation on the other hand has relatively mild eﬀects on real
GDP. All in all, it is suggested that Russia should reduce its vulnerability to adverse
oil price shocks and maintain political stability.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic adjustment in the Russian economy has displayed remarkable variations
during the last decade. The period before the Russian crisis of 1998 was marked by high in-
flation, failing macroeconomic stabilization and disappointing macroeconomic performance.
The Russian government did not succeed to balance its budget and had to draw increas-
ingly on foreign lending to fund its recurrent deficits. This unsustainable budgetary and
exchange rate policy and the remaining instability that governed this period of transitional
recession, culminated in a severe crisis in August 1998 when Russian authorities were forced
to devalue the ruble, suspend payments on government paper, and announce a moratorium
on the Russian foreign debt. By September 20 the ruble had fallen from 6 to 22 rubles per
dollar1.
Rather than the expected final blow, the crisis turned out to be Russia’s economic cathar-
sis2. Indeed, since 1999 the real side of the economy has improved substantially and the
volatility of nominal variables such as prices, wages, interest rates and exchange rates has
declined markedly. There have been various explanations for the recent good macroeconomic
performance of Russia. Some observers suggest that the deadly stabilisation of 1995-1997
was the consequence of an inappropriate exchange rate policy. They argue that the overvalu-
ation of the ruble during the ’corridor’ policy yielded stabilisation at the cost of a prolongued
economic recession. In the line of this argument the devaluation of the ruble in August 1998
kickstarted economic growth through a broad process of import substitution across all sec-
tors. Others put forward that Russia’s economic well-being depends largely on the oil price.
In fact, after 1998 oil prices increased rapidly from a relatively low level of below 15$ to levels
around 41$ per barrel due to a string of external events. As largest crude oil producer and
second-largest crude oil exporter of the world, Russia strongly benefited from higher world oil
prices with a strongly positive current account, abundant foreign reserves and more money
flowing into government coﬀers. Finally, some political economists argue that the political
and economic stabilisation brought by President Putin reduced economic and political risk,
which supposedly created the confidence and trust so badly needed for economic recovery.
1World Bank (2002) oﬀers a detailed survey of the transitional experience in the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union. EBRD (1998) and Gobbin and Merlevede (2000) provide a detailed
account of the Russian Crisis of August and September 1998.
2OECD (2004) compares the consensus growth forecast and its own forecast to actual growth performance
in 2000-2003. Actual Russian GDP growth consistently outperformed the expectations during this period.
2
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic open economy macroeconomic model of
Russia. This model is then employed to analyze (future) Russian macroeconomic perfor-
mance in general, and the role of the oil price, the exchange rate, and political stability in
particular. Modelling and understanding the Russian economy is important since Russia
is arising as the largest neighbour of the enlarged European Union. Moreover, because of
increasing flows of goods, services, capital, and persons between the EU and Russia, both
economies will become more intertwined. Russia also plays an important strategic role as a
supplier of energy and raw materials to the EU, decreasing the EU’s dependence on Middle
East energy sources. Gaining insight in the ’economics’ of this strategic partner to the EU
is therefore not without importance.
The model contains estimated relationships for the basic macroeconomic relations that
govern macroeconomic adjustment, notably private consumption, investment, exports, im-
ports, money demand, labour demand, wage inflation, consumer and producer price inflation.
Further, we model government expenditures and revenues as a function of oil price move-
ments because of the important links between the government budget and oil revenues, a
typical feature of the Russian economy (see Rautava, 2004, and Kirsanova and Vines, 2002).
Starting from the observation in the data that our consumption and investment equations
do not entirely pick up the increase in the respective growth rates since about 2000:1, we
allow for an ’increased confidence’ eﬀect by means of two dummy variables. Since Putin
became acting president in 2000 after the surprising new year’s eve resignation speach of
President Yeltsin and after having wun Duma support in the December 1999 elections, we
tentatively refer to this as the ’Putin’-eﬀect. Since the three eﬀects mentioned above are
explicitly present in the model, we can simulate diﬀerent scenarios to shed some light on how
Russia’s economy will react to shocks in the oil price, the exchange rate and the political
stability. Furthermore, we can identify the channels through which the various eﬀects are
propagated.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present and discuss a
small log-linear macroeconomic model of the Russian economy. Section 3 describes the data
and the estimation methodology. Section 4 estimates this model using quarterly data for
the period 1994:1-2002:4. In section 5 we present in-sample simulation results and discuss
some stylized facts regarding Russia’s macroeconomic adjustment during the last decade.
Section 6 evaluates the impact of shocks in the oil price, in the exchange rate and in political
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stability on Russia’s near economic future by means of dynamic out-of-sample simulations.
The final section summarises and derives policy conclusions.
2 A small macroeconomic model of the Russian econ-
omy
The model is a dynamic, small open economy AD-AS-LM model (see Merlevede et al, 2003,
and Basdevant, 2000). It is tailored to capture the eﬀects of the oil price, exchange rate and
political stability on the Russian economy. This approach will allow us to simulate the eﬀects
of diﬀerent scenarios regarding the three mentioned eﬀects and to uncover the channels along
which the eﬀects arise. Our intention is to find a reasonable fit with a model as parsimonious
as possible, since parsimonity fosters the tractability of the model and the interpretability
of the simulation results. The model consists of eleven macroeconomic behavioral relations,
(1)-(11), and a set additional definitions, (12)-(19), to complete the model. The model is
presented in its long-term form below.
c = α0 + α1 yd (1)
i = β0 − β1 (r −∆py) + β2y (2)
xUSD = γ0 + γ1wtr + γ2pOIL (3)
zUSD = δ0 + δ1y − δ2s (4)
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m1 = ϑ0 − ϑ1r + ϑ2y (5)
py = φ0 + φ1w + φ2
¡
pEUy − eUSDEUR + eUSD
¢
(6)
pc = κ0 + κ1 py + κ2
¡
pEUc − eUSDEUR + eUSD
¢
(7)
w = λ0 + λ1 pc + λ2y − λ3u (8)
n = µ0 + µ1y + µ2 (w − py) (9)
rev = ρ0 + ρ1pOIL + ρ2y (10)
gex = θ0 + θ1pOIL + θ2y (11)
Y ≡ C + I +GC,I +X − Z − CIN (12)
YD ≡ Y −REV +GEX −GC,I (13)
DEF ≡ REV −GEX (14)
U ≡ Ns −N (15)
c ≡ log(C
Pc
), yd ≡ log(
Yd
Pc
), i ≡ log( I
Py
), y ≡ log( Y
Pc,y
) (16)
x ≡ log(X
Py
), z ≡ log( Z
Py
),m1 = log(
M1
Py
) (17)
s ≡ log(
EUSD.P
US
y
Py
) (18)
xUSD ≡ x− s, zUSD ≡ z − s (19)
The (unknown) parameters are assumed to be non-negative, lower-case variables are
defined in logarithms, except for the (short-term) interest rate r, and ∆ denotes the first
diﬀerence operator. The following variables are used: c denotes real private consumption, i
real investment, x real exports, z real imports, py the producer price index, pc the consumer
price level, n the employment level, w the nominal wage per employee, u the log of the
number of unemployed, e the exchange rate defined as the nominal price in rubles of one
unit of foreign currency, subscripts USD and EUR refer to the respective exchange rates
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(so, a rise in e corresponds to a devaluation of the home currency), y real aggregate output,
measured by GDP (the consumption part is deflated by consumer prices, the remainder by
producer prices (see also (12))), DEF the government deficit, with EXP equal to total
government expenditures and REV equal to government revenues, whereas GC,I is the sum
of nominal government expenditure on consumption and investment, Ns the labour supply
measured by the labour force, m1 the level of money demand (which is equal to the money
supply in this equilibrium model).
The first four behavioural relations of the model combine to a standard IS-curve for ag-
gregate demand. More specifically, (1) represents real private consumption, c, as a function
of real disposable income, yd. Consumer prices, Pc, are used to deflate consumption and
disposable income (see (16)). Real private investment, i, in (2) is specified as a function of
real output, y, and the real interest rate, r −∆py. Producer prices, Py, are used to deflate
investment (see (16)). Russian exports, X, consist for more than 70% of oil, other raw mate-
rials and metals. Typically prices for these primary goods are formed on world markets and
contracts are USD-denoted, even though 49% of Russia’s exports go to EU(25). Therefore
the ruble dollar exchange rate, eUSD, is unlikely to influence Russia’s export performance in
the conventional way, i.e. a ruble devaluation against the dollar does not make the majority
of Russian exports more competitive on world markets or vice cersa. Still the ruble dollar
exchange rate will play a role in the the conversion of USD export revenues into rubles in our
model, since GDP is ultimately defined in rubles. Therefore we model real exports denoted
in dollars, xUSD -defined in (19)-, in (3) as a function of world trade and of the oil price.
The oil price is chosen because oil accounts for the bulk of Russia’s exports and the price of
natural gas, the second most important export category, is closely related to that of oil. This
brings an explicit link in the model between Russia’s economic performance and the interna-
tional oil price.3 Since most import contracts are made up in USD, even though 47% of the
imports come from the EU(25), imports, Z, are also modelled in real USD in (4). Obviously,
a depreciation of the real ruble to dollar exchange rate (i.e. USD appreciation) -defined in
(18)- is expected to aﬀect imports negatively. Real imports in USD, zUSD -defined in (19)-,
are a function of the real USD exchange rate and real GDP. Finally, aggregate output (12) is
3Note that it is not possible to capture a quantity eﬀect. By deciding on the number of barrels exported,
Russia can influence its export revenues beyond the impact of the oil price. The world trade indicator can
probably account to some extent for this eﬀect.
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defined by the equilibrium condition that equates aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
GC,I stands for government consumption and investment. Adding changes in inventories,
CIN , make this equation an identity.
Consumer prices are defined in (7) as a weighted basket of domestic and foreign producer
prices. The domestic output price level is explained in a standard way. It is specified in
(6) as a non-decreasing function of domestic factor costs, represented by the (private) wage
costs, and import prices, proxied by EU-prices. EU-prices are first converted to dollars and
then to rubles because to date contracts are generally made up in dollars.
The money market equilibrium is given by the LM curve (5). Money demand is spec-
ified as a decreasing function of interest rates and an increasing function of real income.
Unemployment (15) is defined as the diﬀerence between the labour force, Ns, and total
employment, N . Nominal per capita wages (of the private sector), w, in (8) are assumed
to depend positively on consumer prices, according to a price indexing elasticity λ1, and
negatively on unemployment, u (reflecting a Phillips curve relation). When unemployment
is rising, workers are more concerned with jobs than with wages. This constrains their wage
claims, while at the same time the presence of a larger pool of employable workers will allow
employers to moderate their wage oﬀers. Finally, the nominal per capita wages depend posi-
tively on economic activity. The domestic labour demand (9) is determined by real economic
activity and by the real wage.4
Russia’s dependency on oil (prices) is also captured by a link between oil prices and
the government budget (14). Government revenues in (10) depend on the level of real
GDP and on the oil price. Oil prices are expected to aﬀect government revenues positively.
Under President Yeltsin the fiscal obligations of oil and gas companies were not well defined
and subject to ad hoc negotiations. This has been referred to as informal fiscal rules (see
Tompson, 2002). The outcome of these negotiations was largely subject to the oil price.
Under Putin’s presidency, at least two channels through which oil prices are transmitted
directly to government revenues have been created, namely profit taxes paid by the exporters
(with profit directly a function of the oil price) and variable export duties on raw materials
4Wages do not have an impact on employment:
∆nt = 1.440
(5.58)
− 0.142
(−3.42)
nt−1 + 0.031
(2.16)
(yt−1 − py,t−1)− 0.003
(−0.15)
wt−1 − 0.018
(−1.08)
∆wt;
adj. R2=0.55; DW=1.93; n=36
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exports installed by the Putin administration (the export duties vary in function of prices on
international markets). There are also indirect eﬀects of the oil price on government revenues
through spillovers via higher economic growth created by the higher oil price. Government
expenditures in (11) are also related to both real GDP and oil prices. Obviously if the
government is aware of a strong link between revenues and oil prices, it is reasonable to
expect that a decline in oil prices will pass through to expenditure. Indeed, recent government
budgets have been explicitly based on oil price expectations, and this was implicitly the case
before. The comparison of elasticities of both revenues and expenditures is interesting as
will be explained below.
3 Data and estimation methodology
Quarterly data were drawn from the International Financial Statistics database from the
IMF. In choosing an estimation strategy we need to address: (i) the limited quality of the
data (e.g. the restricted number of observations), (ii) the seasonal pattern in the unadjusted
raw data, (iii) the non-stationarity of almost all variables. Given the presence of seasonal
patterns in most variables, the Census X12-method is used to obtain seasonally adjusted
data (this method has the advantage that the seasonal component can change from year to
year). Once seasonal adjustments are made the non-stationarity of almost all variables, is
taken into account by estimating the behavioral relations (1)-(11) in error-correction form
(ECM), according to the Engle-Granger representation theorem, which can be expressed for
K explanatory variables as follows:
∆yt = α0 + α1yt−1 +
KX
k=1
βkxk,t−1 +
KX
k=1
LkX
l=0
δk,l∆xk,t−l +
MX
m=1
γm∆yt−m + εt
where εt is a white noise error term. Given the restricted number of observations in our
quarterly (seasonally adjusted) dataset we assume in our case that M is equal to 1 and Lk
is equal to 0 for all k. Coeﬃcients from the long term relationship (y = f (xk)) can then be
calculated as −βk/α1.
Therefore we estimate first-order ECMs of the structural macroeconomic relations in
our model. Generally the period of estimation is 1995:I-2002:IV, but the sample size varies
across the equations due to data availibility. As indicated before we prefer parsimonity and
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therefore removed insignificant variables. Parameter testing occurred both on statistical and
economic grounds. Estimation results and interpretation are given in the next section
4 Results and interpretation
The estimates of the structural parameters are shown below.
∆ct = 0.026
(1.91)
dc − 0.316
(−5.14)
ct−1 + 0.287
(5.15)
yd,t−1 + 0.192
(3.88)
∆yd,t−1 (1’)
Adj. R2= 0.52; n = 31 : 1995:II - 2002:IV
∆it = 0.044
(1.77)
di − 0.209
(−2.10)
it−1 − 0.070
(−4.24)
(rt−1 −∆py,t−1) + 0.143
(2.11)
yt−1 (2’)
−0.067
(−3.85)
∆ (rt −∆py,t)
Adj. R2= 0.65; n = 32 : 1995:I - 2002:IV
∆xUSD,t = 0.032
(0.56)
− 0.348
(−2.32)
xUSD,t−1 + 0.080
(1.76)
wtrt−1 + 0.157
(2.69)
pOIL,t−1 (3’)
+0.174
(1.74)
∆pOIL,t + 0.923
(2.38)
∆wtrt
Adj. R2= 0.51; n = 32 : 1995:I - 2002:IV
∆zUSD,t = −0.229
(−0.43)
− 0.429
(−3.04)
zUSD,t−1 + 0.337
(2.67)
yt−1 − 0.325
(−2.94)
st−1 (4’)
+0.211
(2.34)
∆yt − 0.664
(−8.56)
∆st
Adj. R2= 0.71; n = 35 : 1994:II - 2002:IV
∆m1,t = −0.145
(−1.89)
m1,t−1 − 0.057
(−1.89)
rt−1 + 0.127
(1.96)
yt−1 + 0.284
(1.74)
∆yt + 0.327
(1.76)
∆mt−1 (5’)
Adj. R2= 0.14 ; n = 30: 1995:III - 2002:IV
∆py,t = 0.078
(1.20)
− 0.411
(−7.94)
py,t−1 + 0.185
(4.88)
wt−1 (6’)
+0.146
(6.01)
¡
pEUy,t−1 − eUSDEUR,t−1 + eUSD,t−1
¢
+ 0.182
(1.90)
∆py,t−1
Adj. R2 = 0.91; n = 32 : 1995:I - 2002:IV
∆pc,t = −0.221
(−2.67)
− 0.421
(−4.66)
pc,t−1 + 0.246
(3.62)
py,t−1 + 0.334
(3.85)
∆pc,t−1 (7’)
+0.179
(4.65)
¡
pEUy,t−1 − eUSDEUR,t−1 + eUSD,t−1
¢
+ 0.367
(10.84)
∆
¡
pEUy,t − eUSDEUR,t + eUSD,t
¢
Adj. R2 = 0.94; n = 36 : 1994:I - 2002:IV
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∆wt = −0.178
(−2.34)
wt−1 + 0.163
(2.28)
pc,t−1 − 0.067
(−2.99)
ut−1 + 0.175
(3.72)
yt−1 + 0.565
(4.80)
∆pc,t (8’)
Adj. R2 = 0.62; n = 36 : 1994:I - 2002:IV
∆nt = 1.456
(6.28)
− 0.143
(−6.38)
nt−1 + 0.024
(2.30)
log (Yt−1/Py,t−1) (9’)
Adj. R2 = 0.56; n = 36 : 1994:I-2002:IV
∆revt = −3.115
(−2.66)
− 0.428
(−2.86)
revt−1 + 0.225
(2.25)
pOIL,t−1 + 0.721
(2.61)
yt−1 (10’)
+0.250
(1.63)
∆2pOIL,t + 1.424
(4.40)
∆yt
Adj. R2= 0.46; n = 28 : 1996:I - 2002:IV
∆gext = −0.293
(−4.51)
dcrisis − 0.180
(−2.77)
gext−1 + 0.085
(1.63)
pOIL,t−1 + 0.086
(1.63)
yt−1 (11’)
+0.252
(2.52)
∆2pOIL,t + 0.191
(2.29)
∆yt
Adj. R2= 0.46; n = 33 : 1994:IV - 2002:IV
Taking into account the limited sample and the fact that especially the third quarter in
1998 presents a serious distortion because of the August 1998 crisis, the explanatory power of
the estimations is generally fairly high. Real disposable income has a strong positive impact
on consumption in the long run (0.287/0.316=0.908) which is statistically significant. The
short run impact is also statistically significant, but somewhat smaller than in the long run.
Russian economic growth is hence clearly driven by consumption decisions. Real investment
is negatively related to the real interest rate and to real economic activity. The former
also has a considerable short-run impact. Starting from the observation in the data that
our consumption and investment equations did not entirely pick up the increase in the
respective growth rates since about 2000:I, we allowed for an ‘increased confidence’ eﬀect
by means of two dummy variables that take the value 1 from 2000:I onwards. We have
assumed that the economic and political stability brought by the Putin administration has
positively aﬀected consumer and investor confidence. This implies a structural change in
the relationship between the variables in the consumption and the investment equation.
However, the limited amount of observations since 2000 would severely aﬀect the power
of our econometric work. Therefore we prefer to take this ’Putin-eﬀect’ into account by
including a dummy variable (dc and di respectively) in (1) and (2). This has the added
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benefit that it provides a simple way to simulate later on the eﬀect of renewed economic and
political uncertainty on the Russian economy, by simply setting these ’stability’ dummies to
zero in the simulations.
In the long run exports (in USD) depend strongly on oil price movements. The indicator
of world trade is significant at the 10% level, but has a small impact. In the short run however,
changes in the world trade indicator have a large and significant impact on changes in
export revenues. The contribution of oil prices is present, but smaller in magnitude and only
borderline significant. Imports depend negatively on the real exchange rate and positively
on real GDP, as expected. This holds both in the short and the long run. Both consumer
and producer prices are explained very good. EU prices are of considerable importance
in explaining consumer and producer prices, reflecting the eﬀects from pass-through. In
both equations there is a significant lagged dependent variable with a positive coeﬃcient,
reflecting the amount of persistence. For both prices the positive long run eﬀects are strongly
significant. Last quarter’s inflation therefore feeds this quarter’s inflation. Nominal per capita
wages exert a considerable long run impact on producer prices (long run coeﬃcient = 0.45).
A short-run eﬀect is not present.
There is a long run relationship between nominal wages, consumer prices, the number of
unemployed and real economic activity. The long run elasticities of consumer prices and real
economic acitivity are high (0.92 and 0.98), for unemployment it is -0.38. Employees are
thus to a large extent compensated for price increases and also profit from changes in real
economic activity, while unemployment exerts downward pressure on wages, as expected. In
the short run changes in consumer prices have a positive contemporaneous eﬀect on changes
in nominal wages. For employment we only find a long term relationship with real economic
activity.
Turning to government revenues and expenditures, one can infer that in both cases both
the oil price and real economic activity are (significantly) present in both the long and short
run relationship. With respect to economic activity the long and short run elasticities are
higher than the one for revenues. Next to changes in the tax base this probably also reflects
changes in the eﬀectiveness of tax collection, which has risen considerably during the last
five years that happen to coincide with the period of economic growth. For expenditures the
measured elasticities are much lower. Comparing revenues and expenditures, one can infer
an automatic stabilizer function (in normal times) since expenditures react less to economic
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activity than revenues. Indeed, the point estimate of the long run oil price elasticity is consid-
erably lower for the expenditures equation, whike the short run eﬀects are very comparable.
The budgetary balance, defined as the diﬀerence between revenues and expenditures, feeds
directly into real disposable income, aﬀecting thereby real consumption and ultimately all
endogenous variables further down the road.
5 Macroeconomic adjustment in Russia in the period
1994-2002 and dynamic in-sample simulation of the
model
In the previous section we have estimated a small but concise macroeconomic model of the
Russian economy. An interesting and important application of the model concerns its track-
ing ability of the actual macroeconomic adjustment dynamics of the Russian economy. That
is even more interesting in the light of the interesting macroeconomic developments in the
Russian economy. Figure 1 collects the adjustments of the most important macroeconomic
variables. Solid lines indicate the actual adjustments, dashed lines the adjustments pre-
dicted by a (stochastic) dynamic in-sample simulation of our macroeconomic model of the
Russian economy during the period 1994:IV-2002:IV. From the solid lines one can infer the
substantial macroeconomic fluctuations both in real and nominal variables during the last
decade.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
A dynamic simulation is a very useful (and demanding) instrument to assess the model’s
performance: it provides the model with the initial variables of the endogenous variables and
the time paths of the exogenous variables. With this information it solves for the in-sample
dynamics of the endogenous variables. Our interest focuses on the subset of model variables
displayed in Figure 1.
Real private consumption in the Russian economy has displayed significant shifts and
the model has some diﬃculties in tracking the strongest shifts. Real investment was mostly
negative in the first halve of the sample but then picked up; this is also the case in the model.
Growth rates of real imports and exports display a peak one year after the August 1998 crisis.
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The dynamic simulation displays an accurate replication of the dynamics of exports and
imports. Therefore, the model follows also relatively closely the observed current account.
Also the dynamics of real GDP and real disposable income display a marked break in
1998. Before 1998 there is largely stagnation of real output and real disposable income,
after 1998 there is a marked recovery which is also picked up well by the model. The
disappointing growth experience before 1998 and the marked recovery ever since are also
reflected in employment growth. Employment growth is also accurately tracked by the
model.
The Russian economy has not only gone through a period of gradual stabilization of the
real side, also nominal variables like prices (PPI, CPI), wages, and M1-money have seen a
dramatic shift from high inflation and volatility until 1999 and more stability since then.
With the exception perhaps of money growth, whose behavior has been very volatile, the
model tracks very good the dynamics of these variables. The volatility of money balances is
related to the shifts in velocity of M1.
In the model a lot of attention has been given to the modelling of government revenues,
government expenditures and their sum, the fiscal deficit. Fiscal balances have improved
markedly since 1998 as can be clearly seen in Figure 1. The eﬀorts put on modelling the
fiscal variables yield a respectable tracking ability of the model for these variables.
6 Simulating shocks in the oil price, the exchange rate,
and political stability
We now use the model to simulate Russia’s economic future under diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the oil price, the exchange rate, the confidence eﬀect and the interest rate evolution.
The confidence eﬀect refers to the stability dummies in the consumption and investment
equations. Each simulation consists of 1000 stochastic replications of the model under the
diﬀerent scenarios for the period 2000:I to 2007:IV. Hence, the simulations consist of an
in-sample part, where we use the actual data of 2000-2002 and an out-of-sample part, where
we simulate 20 quarters ahead. The Gauss-Seidel algorithm is used to solve the model.
The simulations allow us to compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent scenarios and to uncover the
channels along which these eﬀects arise. The model’s parsimonity fosters the tractability
and interpretability of the simulation results.
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We consider two sets of simulations. Both sets of simulations start from a baseline
scenario 1 that assumes a constant oil price of 27.7$ per barrel since 2003:I, a depreciating
nominal exchange rate in line with the average depreciation rate since about 2001 and a
lasting positive confidence eﬀect. The interest rate is determined by the covered interest
rate parity. In the first set of simulations we concentrate on the eﬀect of oil price shocks
on Russia’s economic future. We consider four oil price scenarios (see figure A.1 for details)
that lie symmetrically around the benchmark scenario of 27.7$ per barrel: i) scenario 2 (the
solid line in figure 2) assumes an abrupt fall of the of the oil price to 12$ per barrel, i.e.
the approximate sample low; ii) scenario 3 (the solid line with dots in figure 2) assumes a
gradual fall of the oil price to 12$ per barrel; iii) scenario 4 (the dashed line in figure 2)
assumes an abrupt increase of the oil price to 43.4$ per barrel; iv) scenario 5 (the dashed
line with dots in figure 2) assumes a gradual increase in the oil price to 43.4$ per barrel. In
a second set of simulations we compare the same benchmark simulation to diﬀerent negative
shocks to the Russian economy. We start again with i) the same scenario 2 (again the
solid line, now in figure 3) exhibiting the oil price collapse to 12$ per barrel. In addition we
add the following scenarios: ii) scenario 6 (the dashed line in figure 3) assumes an abrupt
appreciation of the exchange rate with resulting loss of competitiveness of Russian goods
on the domestic market in comparison with imports (see figure A.1) and the interest rate
now including a 5% risk premium; iii) scenario 7 (the solid line with diamond dots in figure
3) exhibits the reappearance of political and economic instability by setting the stability
dummies in the investment and consumption relation to 0; iv) scenario 8 (the solid line with
triangular dots in figure 3) calculates the worst-case scenario incorporating the cumulated
eﬀect of all three negative shocks of the previous three scenarios, with the risk premium on
the interest now assumed at 10%. Note that the return of uncertainty in scenario 4 may
be less unlikely than one would wish, as shown by the troubles around Yukos in 2004 and
the August 2004 banking panic. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of all 8 scenarios.
Annex A.1 shows the precise oil price paths in scenarios 2-5 and the exact exchange rate
path assumed in scenario 6 and 8.
Figures 2 and 3 report 12 quarters of the main simulated endogenous variables. In both
figures the simulations are reported as deviations from the baseline scenario 1, which is
represented by a horizontal line at zero. The results of our first set of simulations with oil
price scenarios are shown in figure 2. The results of our second set of simulated negative
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Scenario Oil price per barrel Exchange rate Confidence Interest rate
1 constant at 27.7$ depreciation yes CIP∗
2 collapse to 12$ depreciation yes CIP
3 gradual to 12$ depreciation yes CIP
4 shift to 43.4$ depreciation yes CIP
5 gradual to 43.4$ depreciation yes CIP
6 constant at 27.7$ appreciation yes UIP∗∗ (RP 5%)
7 constant at 27.7$ depreciation no CIP
8 collapse to 12$ appreciation no UIP (RP 10%)
∗ CIP means that the interest is set by the covered interest rate parity, that contains only
exogenous variables; ∗∗ UIP means that the interest rate is set by the uncovered interest
rate parity, with the assumed risk premium (RP) indicated between brackets
Table 1: Scenario overview
shocks to the Russian economy are shown in figure 3.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
The simulations of the oil price in figure 2 show that large swings of the oil price are
expected to yield large swings of Russia’s economic success.
Real GDP is strongly aﬀected by oil price shocks, mainly because oil prices have a strong
impact on exports, government revenues and government expenditure, which through a series
of second-order eﬀects in the model aﬀects all other endogenous variables. The simulations
highlight Russia’s striking oil-dependence found in the empirical model. There are two
patterns of asymmetry: (i) negative oil price shocks cause stronger economic adjustments
than positive oil price shocks, and (ii) instantaneous and permanent oil price shocks create
stronger adjustments than gradual changes in the oil price of the same amount. As explained
earlier, these asymmetries are to a significant degree caused by the asymmetric way in which
oil price shocks aﬀect government revenue and government spending in the model.
Indeed, compared to the benchmark, falling oil prices have a stronger eﬀect on real growth
than increasing oil prices, which implies that the Russian economy is still very vulnerable
to downward oil price swings. Note that the same conclusion is reached in Rautava (2004).5
5Rautava (2004) estimates the eﬀects of oil price changes and real exchange rate changes on Russian
output and government revenue using a VAR model. It is found that oil prices and real exchange rate shocks
have a significant impact on Russian output and government revenue. A 10% permanent increase in oil
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The cause for this asymmetric eﬀect on GDP of symmetric oil price shocks lies predominantly
in the elasticities of government revenue and government expenditure to the oil price and
GDP. Government revenues are in the long run much more elastic than government expen-
ditures to both oil prices and real GDP. If oil prices fall, government revenue will fall more
than government expenditure, creating a budgetary deficit. Also exports will be negatively
aﬀected which will also induce lower growth. These growth eﬀects will in turn aﬀect revenues
more severely than expenditures, exacerbating the budgetary problems. This puts Russia
very quickly in a negative spiral, with falling exports, falling budgetary revenues, falling
government expenditure and falling GDP. In further rounds the falling GDP aﬀects private
consumption and investment, which further fuels the downward spiral. In the opposite case
(increasing oil prices) the eﬀects are less dramatic, because the relatively low elasticity of
government expenditure to both oil prices and growth will dampen the positive cycle. Not
all the increased revenues will be immediately spent, inducing less than possible government
consumption (or in other words a budgetary surplus), which in turn marginally constrains
real growth and its multiplicator eﬀects through private consumption and investment in the
next period. As regards the asymmetry between gradual and instantaneous oil price shocks,
the real eﬀects of a gradual versus an abrupt change in the oil price are relatively compara-
ble for oil price increases, but this is not the case for falling oil prices. The abrupt collapse
of the oil price to 12$ per barrel in scenario 2 has a much more severe and lasting eﬀect
on economic growth than a more gradual fall in oil prices. The most important reason for
this lies in the diﬀerent degrees of persistence estimated for the government revenue and
the government spending function. The persistence of the revenue function is much higher
than that of government spending. The abrupt decline of the oil price leads to a sharp and
continued fall in revenues that aggravates the economic downturn. With a gradual decline
in oil prices, revenus and spending adjust much more smoothly and there are considerably
less negative eﬀects on output.
All in all, our simulations suggest that the Russian economy is still very vulnerable to
downward oil price swings. The simulations show precisely how the oil price first transmits
itself through exports and fiscal variables and from there to the rest of the economy. Inter-
estingly, symmetric oil price swings have asymmetric eﬀects on real GDP. Indeed the cost
prices and a 10% permanent real depreciation are found to raise real GDP by 2.2% and 2.4%, respectively.
Moreover, no evidence is found that the Russian economy would have become less sensitive to oil price and
exchange rate developments during the period 1995-2001.
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of a downward swing of oil prices seems to be larger than the benefit of an upward swing.
Note also that scenario 5, with a gradual shift to higher oil prices has become reality. Our
simulations therefore suggest that a considerable part of Russia’s current macroeconomic
success is due to the gradually increasing oil price.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Figure 3 presents results for the various adverse shocks hitting the Russian economy. One
can infer that a collapse of the oil price and the reappearance of instability have similar eﬀects
on real GDP, but the propagation mechanism is quite diﬀerent. Instability mainly aﬀects
growth through a direct impact on real investment and real consumption and in second order
through feedback eﬀects on real wages, employment and government revenues. The oil price
primarily aﬀects real exports (not unexpected given the fact that 70% of exports is in raw
materials, mainly oil and gaz) and the government budget, where revenues expenditure and
the fiscal balance are all negatively aﬀected by the lower oil price. These initial eﬀects than
feed back into real wages and employment and finally all other variables. Although the initial
propagation is quite diﬀerent, the ultimate eﬀect on GDP is comparable in adversity (see
the closely related eﬀects of scenario 2 and 4 in the real GDP panel of figure 3).
A real exchange rate appreciation (the dotted line) has milder eﬀects on real GDP. The
exact result of an appreciation obviously depends on the precise degree of appreciation, but
the conclusion that appreciation has milder eﬀects on real GDP remains qualitatively the
same. This is because opposite eﬀects are at work. An appreciation mainly works through
lower real exports, which aﬀects real GDP negatively, and lower inflation, which mildly
stimulates real consumption and aﬀects GDP positively. Because of these mixed eﬀects the
feed-back mechanisms are moderated and the long term eﬀect of a continued appreciation
is very mild. In fact something like the appreciation scenario already occurred previously in
Russia in 1995-1997, where an exchange rate based stabilization induced moderate inflation
and even yielded moderate consumption-driven growth in 1997. While appreciation by itself
is mild in its eﬀects, it can be very detrimental if combined with shocks in the oil price and
confidence of investors and consumers, as shown in scenario 5.
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7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Macroeconomic adjustments in the Russian economy have displayed remarkable variations
during the last decade. A first period marked by severe instability culminated in a severe
crisis in August 1998. The crisis proved to be a purifying event, because the real side of the
economy has improved substantially and the volatility of nominal variables such as prices,
wages, interest rates and exchange rates declined markedly since 1998. Various explanations
for Russia’s recent economic successes have been put to the fore. Some observers have
suggested that the devaluation of the ruble in August 1998 kickstarted economic growth
through a broad process of import substititution across all sectors. Others have put forward
that Russia’s economic wellness depends largely on the favorable evolution of the oil price.
Thirdly some political economists argue that the current succes is due to the political and
economic stabilisation brought by Putin.
We estimate a dynamic open economy model to analyse macro-economic adjustment in
the Russian economy. The model consists of the basic macro-economic relations that govern
macro-economic adjustment. The estimated model behaves relatively well and it seems
that Russia’s macroeconomic evolution can be understood to a large extent by looking at
standard macro-economic relations. An interesting and novel feature of the model is the
strong correlation between oil price movements, and government expenditures and revenues.
We also find an ’increased confidence’ eﬀect in the consumption and investment equations,
in line with the argument that since Putin became acting president in 2000 economic and
political risk have decreased. In a next step, we simulate Russia’s economic future and
consider 8 diﬀerent scenarios related to the suggested explanations of Russia’s current good
performance. Our baseline assumes a constant oil price, a depreciating nominal exchange rate
in line with the average depreciation rate since about 2001 and a lasting positive confidence
eﬀect. Then we estimate two sets of simulations.
The first set simulates the eﬀects of oil price shocks on the Russian economy, looking at
both negative and positive shocks. Our simulations suggest that the Russian economy is still
very vulnerable to oil price swings, and that these swings have asymmetric eﬀects. Indeed
the cost of a downward swing of oil prices seems to be larger than the benefit of an upward
swing. The government would therefore be well advised in the short run to adopt policies
aimed at reducing the country’s vulnerability to adverse oil price shocks. One possibility is
the introduction of an oil stabilization fund. This is not a new idea and has been previously
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applied in countries as the USA (Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund since 1976) and Norway
(Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund was activated in 1996), to name only the biggest
funds. The idea is to try and balance the budget over the oil price cycle (which roughly
follows the normal business cycles) by means of a fund. The fund should ensure that budget
surpluses because of high oil prices are not wasted but saved instead for a rainy day. This
would also stress Russia’s commitment to fiscal sustainability. However, it requires clear and
transparent rules about deposit and withdrawal for the fund to be used in a non-partisan
way. The Russian government is doing exactly this by creating a stabilization fund that
accumulates funds as long as the price of Ural crude oil exceeds 22$ a barrel and drawing on
this fund in the reverse case. In the light of our results, this policy seems wise and should be
boosted. Another and possibly better alternative to deal with budgetary windfall gains from
high oil prices could be to frontload foreign debt payments. This policy has also been used
by Russia in 2001-2003 and enabled Russia to shave the peaks of its foreign debt obligations
and made its fiscal policy more sustainable and credible. It seems therefore that Russian
policymakers are aware of Russia’s sensitivity to the oil price and is taking advisable steps
to reduce this sensitivity. In the long run the first best is trying to diversify the production
and export structure of the country, so that the oil price elasticities in the model diminish
altogether. This requires an appropriate industrial policy, which falls far beyond the scope
of this paper.
In the second set of simulations we look at several adverse shocks to the Russian economy.
We compare i) a sudden collapse of the oil price to 12$ per barrel (scenario 2 in the first
set of simulations); ii) a quickly appreciating exchange rate with resulting loss of competi-
tiveness; iii) the reappearance of political and economic instability; iv) a worst-case scenario
incorporating all three negative shocks. A collapse of the oil price and the reappearance
of instability have similar eﬀects as regards their eﬀect on real GDP, but the propagation
mechanism is quite diﬀerent. Instability aﬀects growth mainly through a direct impact on
real investment and real consumption and in second order through feedback eﬀects on real
wages, employment and government revenues. The oil price primarily aﬀects real exports
and the government budget. These initial eﬀects then feed back into disposable income, real
wages and employment and finally into all other variables. Although the initial propagation
is quite diﬀerent, the ultimate eﬀect on GDP is comparable. A real exchange rate appre-
ciation has milder eﬀects on real GDP. This is because opposite eﬀects are at work. An
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appreciation mainly works through lower real exports, which aﬀects real GDP negatively,
and lower inflation, which mildly stimulates real consumption and aﬀects GDP positively.
Because of these mixed eﬀects the feed-back mechanisms are moderated and the long term
eﬀect of a persistent appreciation is relatively mild. While appreciation by itself is mild in
its eﬀects, it can be very detrimental if combined with shocks in the oil price and confidence
of investors and consumers, as shown in the worst-case scenario.
We found that the recent success of the Russian economy to a considerable extent hings
on the thread of the oil price, and we explained how Russia is trying to steer the economy
away from its oil-dependence. However the simulations suggest that the adverse eﬀect of
lost political stability and confidence has on aggregate adverse eﬀects that are comparable
to these of an oil price collapse, although the propagation mechanism is entirely diﬀerent.
While the oil price is ultimately out of her control, the government can be held responsible for
stability and confidence. Maybe the increased consumer and investor confidence is the main
contribution of the Putin administration to Russia’s long term economic success. Spoiling
this gained confidence, which is probably less unlikely than apparent from the 2004 election
outcome, would be a capital mistake. The worst case scenario, where lost confidence, a
ruble appreciation and low oil prices go hand in hand, would still yield a collapse of the
Russian economy, as was the case in 1998 under Yeltsin. Therefore the stress on stability
and the drive for industrial diversification are well-placed and its importance for the long
term economic success of Russia should not be underestimated.
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic adjustment in Russia 1994-2002 
and dynamic in-sample simulation 
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Figure 2 — Deviations from scenario 1 (baseline) under diﬀerent oil-price-scenarios for core
set of macro variables (baseline: constant oil price; scenario 2: shock to 12$/barrel; scenario 3:
gradual decrease to 12$/barrel; scenario 4: shock to 43.4$/barrel; scenario 5: gradual increase to
43.4$/barrel)
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Figure 2cntd — Deviations from scenario 1 (baseline) under diﬀerent oil-price-scenarios for
core set of macro variables (baseline: constant oil price; scenario 2: shock to 12$/barrel;
scenario 3: gradual decrease to 12$/barrel; scenario 4: shock to 43.4$/barrel; scenario 5: gradual
increase to 43.4$/barrel)
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Figure 3: Deviations from scenario 1 (baseline) under diﬀerent scenarios for core set of
macro variables (scenario 2: oil shock — sudden decrease to 12$/barrel; scenario 6: exchange rate
appreciation; scenario 7: confidence shock; scenario 8: combination of scenarios 2, 6, and 7)
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Real Wage (%-deviation from baseline)
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Figure 3cntd : Deviations from scenario 1 (baseline) under diﬀerent scenarios for core set of
macro variables (scenario 2: oil shock — sudden decrease to 12$/barrel; scenario 6: exchange rate
appreciation; scenario 7: confidence shock; scenario 8: combination of scenarios 2, 6, and 7)
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Figure A.1: Representation of diﬀerent scenarios
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